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ABSTRACT
We examine the effects of aid on growth--in cross-sectional and panel data--after correcting for the
bias that aid typically goes to poorer countries, or to countries after poor performance. Even after thiscorrection,
we find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship between aid inflows into a country
and its economic growth. We also find no evidence that aid works better in better policy or geographical
environments, or that certain forms of aid work better than others. Our findings, which relate to the
past, do not imply that aid cannot be beneficial in the future. But they

do suggest that for aid to be
effective in the future, the aid apparatus will have to be rethought. Our findings raise the question:
what aspects of aid offset what ought to be the indisputable growth enhancing effects of resource transfers?
Thus, our findings support efforts under way at national and international levels to understand and
improve aid effectiveness.
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One of the most enduring and important questions in economics is whether foreign aid helps 
countries grow. There is a moral imperative to this question: it is a travesty for so many 
countries to remain poor if a relatively small transfer of resources from rich countries could 
set them on the path to growth. In fact, in the Millennium Declaration adopted in 2000, world 
leaders state, “We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the 
abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them 
are currently subjected” and they resolve “to grant more generous development assistance, 
especially to countries that are genuinely making an effort to apply their resources to poverty 
reduction.” As a result, the effort is on to mobilize billions of dollars of aid to help poor 
countries, especially those with good policies and institutions.  
 
Yet, the question of whether aid helps poor countries grow in a sustained way is still mired in 
controversy. In this paper, we will re-examine (yet again!) whether aid leads to growth.
1  
What does this paper add to the voluminous literature on aid effectiveness?  Essentially two 
things. First, most papers in the literature examine aid-effectiveness in a typically narrowly 
defined setting. We attempt to examine the aid-growth relationship under a variety of 
settings, using one common framework. Second, we examine carefully the issue of 
endogeneity –the possibility that aid flows could go to countries that are doing particularly 
badly, or to countries that are doing well, creating a spurious correlation between aid and 
growth. 
 
More specifically, the cross-country aid-growth literature has typically examined particular 
aspects of the possible relationship. Burnside and Dollar (2000), for example looked at the 
impact of aid on growth conditional on the quality of economic policy.  Hansen and Tarp 
(2001) examine the relationship in a pa nel framework, and more recently, Dalgaard, Hansen, 
and Tarp (2004) focus on aid’s impact conditional on the country’s location (geography). 
Recently, Clemens et. al. (2004) disaggregate aid into what they term short- and long-impact 
aid. We examine under one framework, the robustness of the relationship across time 
horizons (medium and long run) and periods (1960s through 1990s), sources of aid 
(multilateral and bilateral), types of aid (economic, social, food, etc.), timing of impact of aid 
(contemporaneous and varying lags (from 10-30 years), specifications (cross-section and 
panel), and samples (including and excluding outliers).  
 
                                                 
1 There is a voluminous literature on aid effectiveness, which is very nicely surveyed in 
Clemens et. al. (2004). Some key papers, in addition to those cited below, include, Alesina 
and Weder (2000), Bauer (1971), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2002), 
Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004), Friedman (1958), Hansen and Tarp (2000), Roodman 
(2004), Svensson (2003), and World Bank (1998). Our reading of this literature, and hence 
the rationale for this paper, is that the existing evidence is mixed.   - 3 - 
 
One reason to try and take a more comprehensive perspective is that the aid-growth literature 
has sometimes followed a cycle in which one paper finds a result, and is followed by another 
paper with a twist, either overturning or qualifying the previous result, followed by another, 
and so on.  This has had some undesirable effects on policy with advocates selectively using 
results to bolster their preferred view on aid. Thus, our aim is not to target any particular 
result or paper.
2 Rather, our approach is to say that if one were starting de novo to examine 
the aid-growth relationship and attempting to do it in a comprehensive and transparent 
manner, based on a reasonable (but by no means perfect) specification and mindful of the 
pitfalls, what would one find. We are, no doubt, informed by the literature about where to 
look.  
 
The existing literature also may have gone down some paths that are worth re-examining. For 
example, the practice of estimating growth regressions over four year periods is quite 
common (see, for example, Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2003) and 
Clemens et. al. (2004)). Four-year growth regressions are prone to be affected by cyclical 
factors, which are hard to control for, even if the attempt is made. Moreover, the issue of key 
interest is the long-run impact of aid: aid could mechanically increase output and growth in 
the short run but this is not what economists care about.
3 If estimations without country fixed 
effects are to be done at all, the appropriate horizon is long.  
 
In particular, aid can contribute to development in two ways. It can take a capital starved 
country to its ultimate steady state potential growth rate faster. Aid can also improve a 
country’s ultimate steady state growth rate (for example, because foreign capital brings 
know-how or encourages better governance or practices). Clearly, as we examine longer 
horizons, we will incorporate more spillover effects, and effects that take time to emerge. 
Since both the positive and adverse effects of aid may stem precisely from these effects (see 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005)), it is hard to see how we can escape examining the long run. 
No doubt one could debate what “long run” means, which is why we examine different 
horizons for the cross-sectional regressions.   
 
But cross-sectional regressions have their well-known problems. Apart from concerns about 
endogeneity, outliers, model uncertainty, and measurement error, a key drawback is the 
problem of unobservable heterogeneity or the omitted variable problem.  In cross-country 
regressions, we can never be sure whether we are controlling for all possible ways in which 
                                                 
2 This is why we do not attempt an exegesis of individual contributions as in Easterly, Levine 
and Roodman (2004), Roodman (2004), or Subramanian and Kumar (2005). 
3 Short-run growth regressions suffer from the problem of extra “noise” induced by cyclical, 
demand-related, factors (see Kraay, 2004). See Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) who argue, based 
on Monte Carlo simulations, that taking account of all the advantages and limitations of the 
different estimation procedures, the pure cross-section OLS estimator that averages data over 
long-periods might be the least inefficient.   - 4 - 
 
countries might differ. Panel estimations have the virtue of addressing, albeit partially, the 
problem of unobservable heterogeneity by incorporating country fixed effects, which means 
that we essentially ask whether changes in aid over time for a country contemporaneously 
affect its growth (see Hansen and Tarp, 2000). The inclusion of country fixed effects is, 
however, not typical in the literature even when the focus is on four year horizons. For the 
panel estimations, we report results using the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Blond GMM 
estimators, which address the potential endogeneity of the regressors, and incorporate 
(implicitly) fixed effects. 
 
Let us now turn to the second main contribution of the paper. As is well recognized, aid 
flows are influenced by a country’s situation. Aid may go to countries that have just 
experienced natural disasters – which would explain a negative correlation between aid and 
growth. It may also go those who have used it well in the past – implying, if growth is 
persistent, there will be a positive correlation between aid and growth. Since neither of these 
relationships is causal, it is important to isolate the exogenous component of aid. While a 
number of prior studies have attempted to “instrument” aid, we will explain later how our 
methodology adds some value.  
 
In sum, despite lying squarely in the tradition of cross-country and panel growth regressions 
with all their well-known shortcomings (see Rodrik, 2005), our objective is to lay out in a 
transparent and structured manner the different ways of looking at the aid-growth 
relationship so that particular claims about it can be evaluated. In some ways, therefore, this 
paper is an attempt at encompassing, or generalizing, past work on aid and growth. It seeks to 
answer the question, “even though the cross-country regression framework may be flawed, 
what does it really tell us about the impact of aid on growth?” 
 
Our findings are relatively easy to report. We find little evidence of a robust positive 
correlation  between aid and  growth, and this despite the fact that our instrumentation 
strategy corrects the bias of conventional (ordinary least squares) estimation procedures 
against finding a positive impact of aid. We find little evidence that aid works better in better 
policy or institutional environments, or that certain kinds of aid work better than others. We 
do find weak (and mixed) evidence that aid works better in some geographical settings, but it 
is hard to see a strong rationale for this finding – and therefore are skeptical whether anything 
can be generalized from this. Our broad findings hold both in cross-section and panel 
estimations, across time horizons, and do not depend on whether outliers are included or 
excluded from the sample. 
 
One explanation may simply be that the effects that even the theory would predict are too 
small to detect against the background noise, at least using the standard cross-sectional 
technique. Certainly, the simple theoretical exercise we present later  suggests that the 
predicted positive effects of aid inflows on growth are likely to be smaller than suggested by 
advocates, even if inflows are utilized well. If noise in the data plague all findings, then 
strong claims about aid effectiveness based on cross-country evidence are unwarranted, and 
aid policies that rely on such claims should be re-examined. 
   - 5 - 
 
However, the effects of other interventions (such as good policies) on growth are indeed 
discernible in the data and are robust. If noise in the data is not the entire explanation for the 
lack of a robust finding, the interesting question then is not “whether” but “why?” That is, 
what is it that offsets the transfers and subsidized credit inherent in aid and prevents it from 
having a robust positive effect on growth? Further research of this kind is essential to 
improve aid effectiveness. This is the focus of Rajan and Subramanian (2005), in which we 
move beyond the cross-country framework. 
 
This paper is structured as follows.  In Section I, we spell out in detail our strategy for 
constructing plausibly exogenous instruments for aid, which we use in the subsequent 
analyses. In Section II, we use these instruments to revisit the question of aid-effectiveness in 
a cross-sectional framework. In Section III, we examine the key issues in a panel context, 
using GMM estimation methods. In Section IV, we compare the magnitude of the aid 
coefficients derived from theory with those obtained in the empirical literature, and conclude 
in Section V. 
    Then fools' 
I.   TACKLING ENDOGENEITY: AN INSTRUMENTATION STRATEGY 
We present in Table 1 the basic descriptive statistics for the data we use in our analysis.  
  
Let us start with OLS cross-country regressions in Table 2. The dependent variable in all 
cases is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP of a country over the relevant 
period. The explanatory variable of interest is the average ratio of annual external aid to GDP 
over that period to that country. Our sample comprises all developing countries which have 
received aid during the post-war period and for which data are available (see Appendix 3).  
Because we include all countries that received aid, we do not have any sample selection 
biases due to countries dropping out of the sample in later time periods because they have 
graduated from aid-recipient status. 
 
 The immediate question is what other explanatory variables should we include?  The aid and 
growth literature includes explanatory variables that are somewhat different from the cross-
country growth literature (see for the example, the contrast between Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), Collier and Dollar (2003), Clemens et. al. (2004), Hansen and Tarp (2001), and 
Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004), on the one hand and Bosworth and Collins (2003), Sala-
i-Martin et. al. 2004, on the other. In the working paper version (Rajan and Subramanian, 
2005), we followed the broader cross-country growth literature. In this paper, however, we 
follow the aid and growth literature to enhance the comparability of our results to the related 
literature. The results are qualitatively similar.  
 
The next question is which particular explanatory variables to chose because even within the 
aid-growth literature there is variation. We chose the four most recently published papers--
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dollar (2003), Hansen and Tarp (2001), and 
Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004)—and take the intersection set of the variables in these 
four papers. This comprises: initial level of per capita income; institutional quality; financial 
depth measured as the ratio of M2 to GDP; assassinations; ethnic fractionalization; trade   - 6 - 
 
policy; inflation; and the ratio of budget balance to GDP. We replace assassinations by 
revolutions only because the latter appears to be  more robustly significant.  We then add two 
measures that are likely to be important correlates with growth; a measure for geographical 
location from Bosworth and Collins (2003) (which is a combination of the average number of 
frost days per month in winter and the fraction of a country’s area in the tropics) and a 
measure of health (which we proxy for with life expectancy). We stress here that our results 
on the aid coefficient are virtually identical even if we don’t add these two covariates: adding 
them gives us a more stable and general specification. Note that one difference between our 
covariates and the papers cited above is that some of them include a composite policy 
measure that combines trade policy, inflation, and budget balance. It seems more general to 
include them separately, rather than force a pre-specified relationship.
4  
 
A final concern before we report results. Easterly (2004) makes the argument that many 
cross-sectional regression results are driven by outliers. We tested for outliers according to 
the Hadi (1992) procedure as implemented in Roodman (2003), using the instrumental 
variable specifications, which constitute the core results of the paper. This procedure yielded 
two outliers for one time period (1980-00) and none for the other periods. For the sake of 
comparability across specifications, throughout the paper we report results for the samples 
excluding these two outliers for the period 1980-00. 
 
We report OLS results in Table 2 for the following four time periods: 1960-2000; 1970-2000; 
1980-2000; and 1990-2000. We therefore cover the long run (40 and 30 year horizons) as 
well as the medium term (10 and 20 year-horizons). The differing estimation periods could 
also give us a sense of any changes in aid effectiveness over time.  
 
The results are quite clear. In all four cases, the estimated aid coefficient is negative, and 
statistically significant at conventional levels in three (1960-2000, 1970-2000, and 1980-
2000). The magnitude in these cases suggests that an increase in aid of 1 percentage point of 
GDP is correlated with lower long-run growth of approximately 0.1 percentage points per 
year.   
  
One cannot take these estimates seriously as evidence of causality because of the problem of 
endogeneity. If donors are Good Samaritans and motivated by suffering in the recipient 
country, the lower the growth (and the more the suffering), the greater will be the desire to 
give aid to alleviate it. Thus there might be a negative correlation between aid and growth but 
this does not reflect causation from aid to growth. Conversely, if donors are motivated to 
give to successful recipients, one might see a positive correlation between aid and growth, 
and this again would not reflect causation from aid to growth. 
                                                 
4 To minimize endogeneity in the cross-section regressions, the values of the potentially 
endogenous explanatory variables are for the beginning of the relevant time period (or 
strictly speaking the first available value closest to the initial year of the relevant time 
period).   - 7 - 
 
 
This problem is well recognized in the literature as is a possible solution, instrumentation, but 
the instrumentation strategy used has limitations. Take for example, the instrument sets used 




Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
 
 
Hansen and Tarp (2002) 
Table 1 
Clemens et. al. (2004) 
1. Dummy for Egypt 
2. Franc zone dummy 
3. Central America dummy 
4. Arms imports (t-1) 
5. ln (population) 
6. Policy * ln(population) 
7. Policy * ln(population)
2 
8. Policy * ln(initial GDP per capita) 
9. Policy * ln(initial GDP per capita)
2 
10. Arms imports (t-1) * policy 
 
1. Dummy for Egypt 
2. Arms Imports (t-1) 
3. Policy (t-1) 
4. Policy
2 (t, t-1) 
5. Policy * ln(population) 
6. Policy * ln(initial GDP per capita) 
7. Policy * ln(initial GDP per 
capita)
2 
8. Policy * aid (t-1) 
9. Policy * aid
2 (t-1) 
10. aid (t-1) 
11. aid
2 (t-1) 
1. Egypt dummy  





5.  Policy * ln population  
6. Policy * initial GDP per capita 
7. Policy * initial GDP per capita
2   
8. Aid (t-1) * policy (t-1)  
9.  Aid
2 (t-1) * policy (t-1) 
10. Log repayment (t-1) * policy (t-1) 
11. Aid (t-1) 
12. Aid
2 (t-1) 
13.  Log repayment (t-1)  
14.  Policy (t-1) 
 
 
A variable such as arms imports could be a proxy for strategic reasons for giving aid, and 
thus is plausibly orthogonal to motives for giving aid that relate to the underlying economic 
situation of the recipient. Not all variables are so plausibly exogenous. For variables that are 
some transformation of current or lagged endogenous (aid) and possibly exogenous (policy) 
variables, the economic motivation is more difficult to understand. Moreover, 
econometrically, the problem with using lagged values of endogenous variables is that they 
might be predetermined but still not exogenous, especially if there is serial correlation in the 
dependent variable.  And in all these papers, the possibility of serial correlation is high 
because growth is measured over a fairly short interval (i.e., growth today is depressed 




More questionable is the use of the lag of a right hand side variable (policy) as an instrument. 
This amounts to claiming that contemporaneous policy affects growth directly but lagged 
policy does not. Put differently, the exclusion restriction underlying the use of lagged policy 
                                                 
5 Assessing the validity of the instrumentation strategy in many of these papers is rendered 
difficult by the fact that first-stage results are seldom reported, nor are the exclusion 
restrictions discussed. Roodman (2004) only tests the robustness of recent results reported in 
a number of papers, but does not discuss endogeneity or instrumentation issues.   - 8 - 
 
is that trade reform (and macroeconomic stabilization) in a time period has an important 
effect on growth in that time period (four years in the case of the standard specification in the 
literature) but absolutely no effect four years later.
6  
 
It is to address some of these limitations that we attempt a different instrumentation strategy, 
where we construct instruments for aid. We exploit the fact that aid is often extended for 
non-economic reasons. Our main identification assumption is that non-economically-
motivated aid is unlikely to be driven by economic outcomes. This notion is far from new.  A 
number of papers have used this to explain aid flows (Alesina and Dollar, 2001; and Barro 
and Lee, 2004). But we are not aware of papers that have taken the obvious next step of 
exploiting it to systematically develop instruments for aid which could be used in aid-growth 
analyses. 
 
Our key idea for instrumentation is to model the supply of aid based on donor-related rather 
than recipient-specific characteristics. In other words, we base our instrument on 
considerations that drive individual donors to give aid to a country other than those related to 
a country’s level of income or growth. So, our construction of instruments starts from the 
bilateral (donor-recipient) relationship and aggregates up (as Frankel and Romer (1999) have 
done in the trade literature).  This is in contrast to the literature that picks instruments directly 
at the level of the recipient country. 
 
Start first with how a donor would choose to allocate aid across recipients. If we make the 
plausible assumption that in a fair world a donor wants to induce similar growth rates in per 
capita incomes of all poor recipients then, provided the technologies of production of 
recipients and capital shares are similar, the donor (as we show later in section IV) should 
allocate similar amounts of aid (relative to recipient GDP) for each recipient. Of course, most 
donors are likely to depart from this allocation for at least two reasons:  history and 
influence. The greater the extent of historic relationships between a donor and a recipient the 
more likely that a donor will want to give aid.  We capture historic relationships through 
colonial links and commonality of language. To capture to the effects of influence, we make 
the plausible assumption that donors are more likely to want to give aid the more they expect 
to have influence over the recipient. One way to proxy for influence is through the relative 
size of donor and recipient. The bigger the donor is relative to the recipient, the more 
influence the donor is likely to have, so the ratio of the donor population to that of the 
recipient could be a good proxy for influence. In addition, a donor’s influence is likely to be 
particularly pronounced if it is relatively large when it has close links with the recipient (so 
that it not only understands the pathways of influence but also potentially scares away other 
                                                 
6 Put differently, a rationale for not using lagged policy as an instrument is that the process 
which generates lagged policy may involve error terms which are correlated with the error 
terms on growth in the future. Intuitively it means that countries which experience positive 
policy shocks may also be experiencing positive growth shocks 4 years from now (because of 
good leadership, for instance).   - 9 - 
 
donors from seeking influence). We capture this channel by including the interaction 
between relative size and colonial links.  
 
An example should help fix ideas; the U.K. should be willing to give more aid per capita to 
Uganda than to India; but it will be more willing to give aid to Uganda than to a similar-sized 
country in Africa, say Senegal, because France is likely to have a significant aid presence in 
the latter, thus diluting any possibility of British influence. 
 
The aid supply decision from a donor (d) to a recipient (r) can be expressed by the following 
model:   
 
1
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where  drt A  is the aid given by donor d to recipient r in time period t. GDPrt is the recipient 
country’s GDP.
 7 The first three RHS variables capture historic factors: COMLANG is a 
dummy that takes a value of one if the donor and recipient share a common language; 
CURCOL is a dummy that takes a value of one if the recipient is currently a colony of the 
donor. COMCOL is a dummy that takes a value of one if the recipient was ever a colony of 
the donor. The next four variables simply disaggregate the colonial variable to capture 
difference across donors in the susceptibility of their giving to colonial ties (COMCOLUK, 
COMCOLFRA, COMCOLSPA, and COMCOLPOR refer in turn to colonial relationships 
involving respectively the U.K. France, Spain and Portugal)   
 
The next set of variables relate to relative size. Donor size relative to the recipient is 
measured by the ratio of the logarithm of the populations of donor and recipient 
(log( / ) dr POP POP )
8 . Donor influence relative to other donors is additionally measured by 
                                                 
7 In order to estimate equation 1, we need to compute the country’s total (i.e. bilateral and 
multilateral) aid that goes to any particular recipient. To do this, we obtain a decomposition 
of multilateral aid into its underlying bilateral constituents. The OECD DAC database 
contains a series called “imputed” bilateral aid, which does precisely this.   
8 To minimize problems, we use the initial rather than the contemporaneous value of 
population.   - 10 - 
 
the interaction of the relative population size and the colonial dummy 
(log( / )* dr d r POP POP COMCOL ).  
 
The estimated equation is then aggregated across donors to yield a level of the fitted value of 






A Y GDP β ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑        ( 2 )  
 
In Table 3, we present estimates for the model in (1).
9 Virtually all the instrumenting 
variables are significant for all the time horizons, and between them the variables account for 
a reasonable share (between 33 and 42 percent) of the variation in the donor allocation 
decision. All the colonial relationships are significant as are the two measures of influence. 
The larger the donor relative to the recipient, the greater the aid given; and this effect is 
magnified, as conjectured, in cases where the donor had a colonial relationship with the 
recipient. For example, for the period 1960_00, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of donor size 
relative to recipient is associated with a 0.1 percent increase in the ratio of aid to GDP given 
by the average donor, an amount which is increased by 0.2 percent for a UK colony (which is 
the sum of 0.6 percent for the average colony minus 0.4 percent for the UK colony dummy), 
1 percent for a Spanish colony; 1.9 percent for a French colony and 3.3 percent for a 
Portugese colony. Thus, influence seems to matter a lot for donors, especially for Portugal 
and France.  
 
How much information about aid is contained in our instrument?  In Chart 1, we depict the 
first-stage relationship between actual and fitted aid calculated from the estimates of model 1 
for the period 1960-00 after partialling out the effects of other covariates included in the first 
stage. The relationship between actual and fitted aid is strong, with a t-statistic of about 5. 




II.   AID AND GROWTH: REVISITING THE CROSS-SECTION EVIDENCE 
In this section, we revisit the cross-country evidence with two aims.  First, we examine 
whether instrumenting for aid affects the results on aid effectiveness. Second, we explore if 
the aid-growth relationship varies across time horizons and periods, sources of aid, types of 
aid, episodes of growth, and specifications.  
 
                                                 
9 Throughout the paper, instruments vary according to the time horizon of the analysis.  For 
example, in growth regressions for 1960-2000, we estimate model 1 for the period 1960-
2000; for 1970-2000, the equations are re-estimated for the period 1970-2000; and so on.   - 11 - 
 
The basic IV results 
 
We now present estimates for the cross-sections presented earlier in Table 2, with the 
difference that we instrument for aid. 
10 In Tables 4A, we present the second-stage of the core 
instrumental variable (IV) specifications, which is representative of the results we obtain 
more broadly. The equations are reasonably well specified as many of the standard covariates 
are significant and have the expected sign. The coefficient on the aid term is not significantly 
different from zero in three of four periods, while it is negative and significant in the period 
1990-00. We should not put too much weight on this last result because, as we will see from 
later tests, the instrumentation strategy is least reliable for this period.  
 
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficient of aid are generally quite small, suggesting that 
aid has a very small effect—positive or negative—on growth. Also, for the first three 
columns, instrumenting seems to make the impact of aid less negative or more positive 
(compare the aid coefficients columns in Table 2 columns 1-3 with those in Table 4A 
columns 1-3). In other words, the IV strategy tempers the tendency of the OLS to magnify 





Let us now turn to possible concerns about our instruments. First, do they satisfy the 
exclusion restriction – that is, are they plausibly exogenous? As Durlauf et. al. (2004) point 
out growth theory is so broad and all-encompassing that it is always possible to find a story 
about why an instrument merits inclusion in the second-stage regression, invalidating 
instrumentation. In our framework, the colonial and influence variables may be correlated 
with growth other than through the endogenous variable. For example, proximity to donors 
(say through a common language) might be bad because donors require bad policies or 
support bad leaders or require greater defence-related spending.  Alternatively, proximity to 
donors might be good because they impose good conditionality.  Also, certain colonial 
relationships may imply a certain quality of current institutions with impacts on growth. In 
each of these cases, the exclusion restriction might not be satisfied.  One response to this 
concern is that in general we control for the different ways (policies and institutions) in 
which historical variables can affect growth. 
 
                                                 
10 The standard errors are affected by the fact that the instruments are estimated. The standard 
error correction we used to estimate the correct standard errors is based on Frankel and 
Romer (1999). The results were virtually unaffected by this correction. 
11 As indicated in Table 4B, the coefficient estimate for the instrument is significant at the 1 
percent significance level for all estimation periods. In the three long horizons, the F-test for 
excluded instruments comfortably exceeds the weak instrumentation threshold of ten 
suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) for the case of one endogenous regressor. For the 
1990_2000 horizon, the F-statistic is about 8.5.   - 12 - 
 
A crude way of testing whether our colonial variables pass the exclusion restriction is to 
simply include the colonial variables for the UK, France and Spain directly in the second 
stage. When we do this (Table 5A), the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates on aid are not 
significantly altered across periods (compare Table 5A and Table 4A) and we do not find a 
consistent pattern of the colonial variables being significant. This suggests that a direct 
relationship between colonial variables and growth is not responsible for our results. 
  
A second check is to see if our instrument passes over-identification tests. For this, of course, 
we need a second instrument. As is well-known, it is very difficult to find such instruments, 
especially one that is very different from the instrument that we have proposed in this paper. 
But to the extent that over-identification tests have merit, a possible candidate is country size; 
for example, even if donors did not care about influence, economies of scale (in dealing with 
recipients, monitoring programs, etc.) might, a priori, suggest recipient size as a factor 
determining aid decisions. Given our use of population as a scaling variable for measuring 
influence in our preferred instrument for aid, we use the logarithm of recipient area as the 
second instrument. So, we re-run the growth equation, this time using as instruments in the 
first stage both our instrument derived from model (1) as well as the log of area. The results 
are presented in Tables 5B (second-stage) and Table 5C (first-stage).  
 
The first thing to note is that the coefficient on the aid variable is insignificant (Table 5B), 
establishing the robustness of the core result. Second, the p-values for the Sargan test for 
over-identifying restrictions are greater than 0.1 in three out of four cases, suggesting that our 
preferred instrument at least passes these minimum requirements. The over-identification test 
is, however, not met for the 1990-2000 horizon, which is why the IV strategy (and the 
negative and significant coefficient) for this period should be viewed with caution.  
 
Third, adding area as an additional instrument serves to shed light on our preferred 
instrument. It is interesting to note in the first-stage results (Table 5C) that area is not 
significant in the three long horizons while our preferred instrument is. This suggests that our 
instrument contains a lot of information over and above that relating simply to recipient 
size.
12  Finally, we present in Table 5D, an intuitive way of illustrating the exclusion 
restriction (as suggested in Acemoglu et. al., 2001). We estimate the first stage, 
instrumenting aid with log area, and in the second stage also introduce our preferred 
instrument directly. The instrument is insignificant in three out of four cases (and only 
marginally significant in the 1990_00 horizon), again suggesting that it has no independent 
effect on growth. 
                                                 
12While a measure of country size could in itself be a plausible instrument, the reason not to 
make it the preferred one is that there is uncertainty whether it can satisfy the exclusion 
restriction; that is, a number of reasons can be advanced as to why a recipient’s size would 
have an independent effect on growth. Our instrument, on the other hand, contains 
information that is not based on recipient size, and the finding in Table 5C is consistent with 
that.   - 13 - 
 
 
Of course, none of our attempts at addressing endogeneity through instrumentation are fool-
proof. Another, albeit rough way of doing this is simply to use initial or lagged values of aid 
instead of instrumenting for contemporaneous values. We do this in Table 6, attempting to be 
comprehensive by encompassing all possible timings of impact. Moving across the table are 
columns representing the different growth horizons: 1960-00, 1960-90 etc. etc. In all, there 
are nine such horizons. Moving down the table, we use different lags for the aid variable. So 
the first row represents the impact of aid given in 1960-70 on growth in 1960-70 (column 1), 
1970-80 (column 2), 1960-80 (column 6) and so on. The table thus presents the OLS estimate 
for lagged aid in the standard growth regression for different horizons, time periods, and lags 
for aid. In no case is the estimated coefficient on lagged aid positive and significant. Fully 32 
of 37 coefficients are negative, of which 11 are statistically significant.  Typically, the 
estimated coefficient is small (below 0.1 in magnitude). 
 
Non-linear and conditional  effects 
 
Let us turn to concerns about specification. In Panel A of Table 7, we ask whether there are 
diminishing returns to aid. To test this, we include a squared aid term in the regression. All 
the aid terms are insignificant as are the aid-squared terms. There is no consistent pattern in 
their signs (a negative squared term would imply diminishing returns). 
 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2003) suggest that aid, even if it does not 
unconditionally help growth, is helpful in those countries that have good policies and 
institutions. In Panel B, we examine whether aid is more effective in better policy 
environments. We interact aid with two measures, first, the Sachs-Warner measure updated 
by Warcziarg and Welch (2003). We find that the coefficient on the aid-policy interaction 
terms is never significant. This is consistent with the results in Easterly, Levine, and 
Roodman (2004). We find similar results when we interact aid with the World Bank’s CPIA 
ratings. 
 
Recently, Dalgaard et. al. (2004) have argued that aid’s effectiveness depends on geographic 
location. In fact, Roodman (2004) concludes after testing the robustness of a number of prior 
results on aid effectiveness that “if there is one strong conclusion from this literature, it is 
that on average aid works well outside the tropics but not in them.” Though there are 
plausible stories for why growth may be higher outside the tropics, the rationale for the 
effectiveness of aid outside the tropics (or its ineffectiveness within) is unclear. But in the 
absence of a strong theoretical rationale, any such result might simply be an (ex post) way of 
characterizing countries where aid has “worked” from countries where it has not, without 
offering an explanation.
13 The underlying policy conclusion is also a little bleak because aid 
                                                 
13 Put differently, there will always be a sample of countries where the aid growth correlation 
is positive, even if the true average effect is zero or negative. Given that there are many 
characteristics by which we can sort countries, it is not hard to find a characteristic that lines 
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and aid effectiveness are especially important inside the tropics, where most of the poorest 
countries are situated. 
 
But does aid conditional on geography show up in the cross-section? In Panel C of Table 6, 
in addition to the standard covariates, we introduced a term, interacting aid with the measure 
of geography due to Bosworth and Collins (2003).
14  While geography itself usually has a 
positive correlation with growth, the aid-geography coefficient is never significant. 
 
Categories of aid: “Good” and “bad” aid 
 
One of the increasingly popular strands in the aid-growth literature is to examine the impact 
of different categories of aid.  That is, researchers are moving from analyzing the impact of 
aggregate aid to analyzing different components. Four different basis of distinguishing aid 
are: 
•  Motives for granting aid (why?) 
•  Donor type (who is granting aid?) 
•  The use to which aid is put (for what: health, social sector, technical assistance) 
•  The timing of impact (when?) 
 
A general problem with making distinctions between aid is fungibility. Earmarking of aid is 
not easy, especially for small donors, and even if it is, governments can divert traditional 
sources of financing to other uses, undermining the earmarking objectives of aid (that is for 
fungibility to be violated, two conditions need to be fulfilled: it should be possible to earmark 
aid for particular uses and it should not be possible for the government to then divert other 
expenditure that would otherwise have gone to those uses). At the very least, claims about 
earmarking (which are implicit in slicing up aid into different sub-categories) need to be 
substantiated.  
 
However, let us set aside the possibility that aid is fungible (though see Devarajan and 
Swarup, (1998) for evidence that aid is fungible) and examine whether sub-categories of aid 
have differential effects. Consider first, the distinction based on motives.  
 
One possible concern with our instrumentation strategy is that it highlights an “influence” 
channel for giving aid that may not be in the best interests of the recipient. More generally, 
some recent papers (see Bourgingnon and Sundberg (2007)) tend to dismiss strategic aid as 
                                                                                                                                                       
up with the countries for which the correlation is positive. However, it is not clear what 
conclusion one can draw from such a finding. 
14 The Bosworth and Collins (2003) geography measure is a combination of the average 
number of frost days per month in winter and the fraction of a country’s area in the tropics, 
whereas the Dalgaard et. al. (2004) measure is just the latter but the two are highly correlated 
(correlation of 0.92 in our sample).   - 15 - 
 
“bad” aid, and thus emphasize there should be no prior expectation of beneficial effects from 
that kind of aid.  
 
An important distinction needs to be made here between the motives for giving aid and how it 
is used. Why aid is given need have very little relationship to how it is used. To characterize 
strategic aid as “bad” aid is mixing motives and consequences. Indeed, for strategic aid to be 
“bad” aid (as in badly used aid leading necessarily to bad growth outcomes) two things 
would have to be shown; First, that strategic aid is systematically given to countries with bad 
policies or institutions; Second, it would also have to be shown that in some way researchers 
are not taking into account the effect of these bad policies and institutions that mediate aid 
into outcomes.  
 
The second factor is relatively easy to dispose because typically, most growth regression 
control for a host of policies and institutions—macroeconomic, structural, openness and 
property rights etc.—that potentially affect growth. In other words, our regressions suggest 
that aid has no systematic effect even after controlling for any effect of strategic aid on 
policies and institutions.  
 
On the first point, it should be noted just as an empirical matter, that while aid was given for 
strategic reasons to Mobuto in Zaire and Marcos in the Phillipines and to Egypt, it was also 
given to Suharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile, military regimes in Korea and Israel, all of 
which seem to have flourished. Equally, a lot of well-intentioned aid was given by the Nordic 
donors to Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya and a host of other African countries that do not seem to 
have grown strongly. Thus strategic aid is not synonymous with badly used aid.  
 
To bolster this point consider the comparison between (1) the correlation between the Sachs-
Warner variable (a good proxy for policies and institutions) and our predicted aid and (2) the 
correlation between the Sachs Warner variable and aid from the top 5 good donors to 
recipients (from Reddy and Miniou (2006)): For the four periods, 1960_00, 1970_00, 
1980_00, and 1990_00, covered in our analysis, the correlations are  -.03 vs -.016 (1960_00); 
-.04 vs -.14 (1970_00); -.02 versus -.07 (1980_00); and -.14 versus -0.17 (1990_00).
15  In 
other words, in three out of four cases, our predicted aid was less negatively correlated with 
good policies and institutions than so-called “good” aid. This suggests the whole enterprise 
of classifying aid as good or bad is on relatively weak empirical ground. 
 
Another way of checking whether our instrument for aid proxies for “bad” aid is to see if the 
variables that we used to explain total aid also help explain “good” aid. Appendix Table 1 
reproduces the estimation in Table 3 but this time with bilateral social aid as the dependent 
variable (and social aid is typically thought of as “good” aid). It is remarkable how similar 
                                                 
15 The pattern is broadly similar when we look at the World Bank’s CPIA ratings instead of 
the Sachs-Warner variable and also when we consider the top 10 good donors instead of the 
top 5.   - 16 - 
 
the two equations: all the variables have the same sign and significance (although the 
magnitudes of the coefficients vary) and both equations explain a similar share of variation. 
We now proceed to the other distinctions. 
 
A second basis for distinguishing “good” or development aid is by type of donor.  Reddy and 
Minoiu (2006) argue that aid given by a set of countries—mostly Scandinavian—is good aid, 
or better than that given by others and they similarly argue that multilateral aid is better than 
bilateral aid.
16  We test these propositions. One can indeed make the argument that 
multilateral aid is less explicitly “political” than bilateral aid and should therefore have a 
different, and presumably more favorable, impact. The argument for a possible differential 
impact between multilateral and bilateral aid could also relate to the type of aid given or to 
the nature and effectiveness of conditionality. But we find no difference between the effects 
of multilateral and bilateral aid (Table 8A); both sets of coefficients are insignificant. We 
also ran the specifications in Table 6, using another Reddy and Miniou definition of good 
donors (both the top 5 and the top 10). As can be seen from Table 8B (aid is that from the top 
5 donors), in only 13 of 37 cases is the aid coefficient positive, and in only one is it 
significant at conventional levels. 24 of 37 coefficients are negative, and significant in 3 
cases. If anything, even after a careful selection of donors, the weight of evidence is towards 
a slight negative effect of aid.
17  
 
The third basis for distinguishing aid is by purpose. This basis is particularly prone to the 
fungibility/earmarking problem. If donors cannot individually or collectively alter the plans 
and priorities of recipient governments, then it is hard to justify slicing aid.
18 In Table 8C, we 
try to see if two different categories—aid for social uses and aid for economic uses have 
significant positive effects.
19 This does not turn out to be the case.  
 
                                                 
16 One additional problem of distinguishing aid simply by donor type is that it is then difficult 
to understand why one should expect similar consequences if it is given to two very different 
types of policy regimes. Why should aid by Norway to Tanzania produce the same result as 
aid by Norway to Zaire under Mobutu? 
17 The results are similar when we use the top 10 good donors. 
18 One category of aid that might avoid the fungibility problem is technical assistance 
because of the manner in which it is provided: essentially, donors pay foreign consultants to 
provide some service to recipient governments. But technical assistance too does not seem to 
have any impact on aid either. 
19 The categories come from the OECD’s DEC database that provide data on ODA 
commitments by purpose (CRS).  Social sector aid includes education, health and population, 
and water supply and sanitation; and economic aid includes energy and transport and 
communications.   - 17 - 
 
Finally, Clemens et. al. (2004) claim that aid needs to be distinguished by the timing of its 
impact—early versus late impact. Clemens et. al (2004) argue that the effect of early-impact 
aid will be easier to detect in the data than late-impact aid. Subramanian and Kumar (2005) 
contains a critique of their framework and findings. We re-run our specifications using their 
aid categories and find that there is no significant effect (Table 8D).
 20 In fact, our results in 
Tables 6 and 8B where we estimate the impact of aid over different lags (and hence is a more 
general test) also bears on the point made by Clemens et. al. (2004) about the timing of aid’s 
impact. We see in these tables that regardless of when aid’s impact can be thought to be felt, 
there seems little evidence that aid affects growth. 
 
In general, what we find, however, is that no sub-categories have any significant impact—
positive or negative--on growth. There is, however, a more general concern with slicing and 
dicing up aid; it could become a fishing expedition where the researcher hunts for any sub 
category that has a positive (or negative) correlation with growth, and then finds an (ex-post) 
rationale to focus on that sub-category, depending on the researcher’s biases. This is why the 
a priori theoretical rationale for focusing on a particular sub category is important. 
Unfortunately, fungibility renders most such rationales suspect.  
 
 
III.   AID AND GROWTH: REVISITING THE PANEL EVIDENCE 
In this section, we revisit the aid-growth evidence based on panel estimations. Much of the 
literature, with the exception of Hansen and Tarp (2002) and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp 
(2004), employs either OLS or 2-stage least squares estimations procedures without fixed 
effects.  
 
An alternative approach that addresses the potential endogeneity of all the regressors and also 
incorporates fixed effects is to use panel GMM regressions.
21  These come in two flavors. 
                                                 
20 We need to instrument for early impact and late impact aid. In the Clemens et. al. (2004) 
categorization, the former contains many of the economic aid categories and the latter the 
social aid categories.  So in our specifications that use the Clemens et. al. (2004) variables, 
we instrument for early impact aid with our instrument for economic aid and for late impact 
aid with the instrument for social aid. Recall that our instrument for economic aid is derived 
by running an equation explaining bilateral economic aid flows between donors and 
recipients (as we did for bilateral total aid in Table 3). We then constructed a series for fitted 
economic aid by aggregating across donors for each recipient. Similarly, we develop the 
instrument for social aid. The first-stage results (available from the authors upon request) 
show that these instruments work well. 
21 It is important to stress that fixed effects are not a panacea and come with their own 
problems: first, they do not help inference if there are time-varying omitted factors affecting 
the dependent variable and correlated with the right hand side variables. They may also 
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There is the difference-GMM estimator due to Arellano and Bond (AB)(1991) and the 
system-GMM estimator due to Blundell and Bond (BB) (1998). In both, identification relies 
on first-differencing and using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments.  
 
In the AB estimator, lagged levels are used to instrument for the differenced right hand side 
variables, whereas in the BB estimator the estimated system comprises the difference 
equation instrumented with lagged levels as in the AB estimator as well as the level equation, 
which is estimated using lagged differences as instruments. Each estimator has its limitations. 
The AB estimator often leads to a weak instruments problem because lagged levels are 
typically not highly correlated with their differenced counterparts. On the other hand, the BB 
estimator generates large upward biases in the right-hand side variables (see Hauk and 
Wacziarg, 2004). The BB estimator has another deficiency: the instruments for the level 
equation, namely the lagged differences of the RHS variables, are valid only if they are 
orthogonal to the fixed effect. Given neither estimator is perfect, we report the results using 
both procedures. 
 
In Tables 9 and 10, we report the results of the GMM estimations corresponding to the core 
specifications in Tables 4 and Tables 7A-7C (the specifications in Table 9 use the Arellano-
Bond procedure while those in Table 10 use the Blundell-Bond procedure). In all these 
specifications, we report the results of using the unrestricted lags of all the endogenous 
variables as instruments. The results do not change when we use fewer lags (available from 
the authors).  
 
The results are easy to summarize.  In all the GMM specifications, which we would 
emphasize are really fixed effects panel versions of the cross-section regressions reported in 
tables 4 and 7, the results on aid remain broadly unchanged.  In column 1 of Tables 9 and 10, 
we report the core specification corresponding to Table 4.  In column 2, we test whether there 
are diminishing returns by adding the squared aid term (compare with Table 7, Panel A). 
Column 3 is the counterpart of Table 7, Panel B, which tests whether aid works better in 
better policy environments.  Finally, in column 4 the aid-geography interaction is examined 
(compare with Panel C of Table 7). In no case, does aid have a positive and significant effect 
(the coefficient is negative and significant in Table 9, column 1 and in Table 10, column 4). 
There is no evidence of aid working in better policy environments (see the coefficients of the 
interaction between aid and policy in column 3 of Tables 9 and 10). There is some evidence 
for aid working better in better geographic environments using the AB estimate (Table 9, 
column 4) but the sign of the coefficient estimate for the aid-geography interaction is 
reversed (and significant) in the system GMM BB estimate in Table 10.  
 
In Appendix Tables 2 and 3, corresponding respectively to the AB and BB procedures, we 
examine the impact of different categories of aid as in Table 8. Only early impact aid is 
                                                                                                                                                       
exacerbate measurement error by removing a significant portion of the variation in the right 
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significant at the 10 percent level (and it has diminishing effectiveness as suggested by the 
negative coefficient for the squared term). However, in the system GMM BB estimates in 
Appendix Table 3, the signs of the coefficient estimates are reversed, and they are no longer 
significant. It is hard to argue that even in the panel estimates, there is a robust effect of aid 
on growth.  
 
IV.   QUANTITATIVE IMPACT OF AID: THEORY AND EMPIRICS 
What should one expect? Suppose the primary channel through which aid worked was by 
increasing public investment.
22 What then would be the quantitative impact on growth? A 
theoretical estimate of this impact can be obtained from a simple growth model. This model 
yields the conclusion that, even under the most optimistic assumptions about the use of aid 
(optimistic in the sense that all aid is invested and none of it is wasted or consumed), the 
impact of aid should be positive but relatively small in magnitude.   
 
Specifically, the relationship between aid inflows and growth is captured by the following 











where γy is the rate of growth of output per worker, Aid/Y is the ratio of aid to GDP, α is  
capital share in income, β is the fraction of aid that is invested, and Y/K is the output capital 
ratio (Y/K). Assuming that all aid is invested (β =1), and using a value of capital share in 
income of 0.35 computed by Bosworth and Collins (2003), and a value of 0.45 for the 
output-capital ratio for the average developing country in our regression sample, the 
magnitude of the regression coefficient suggested by theory is 0.16; that is, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the ratio of aid to GDP should at most raise the long-run growth rate by 
0.16 percent, even on the most optimistic assumption that all aid is usefully invested. More 
realistically, if half of all aid is wasted or consumed, the coefficient value should be close to 
0.1. Of course, if the public investment financed by aid has some spillover effects and hence 
an effect on productivity growth, the impact of aid could be slightly higher. 
 
How does this theoretical estimate compare with the magnitudes in the empirical literature? 
Sampling a few of the more influential papers that find a positive impact of aid on growth, 
the pattern that one discerns is that OLS and two-stage least squares estimations yield lower 
magnitudes than GMM estimations.  The Clemens et. al. (2004) estimations yield values for 
the aid coefficient of about 0.64 and 0.33 in their IV and OLS estimations, respectively. The 
                                                 
22 Of course, aid by financing schooling and increasing human capital accumulation could 
also lead to total factor productivity growth. We discuss this channel below.    - 20 - 
 
GMM estimations of Hansen and Tarp (2000, Table 1) yield values close to 0.3, and in 
Dalgaard et. al. (2004) the implied value varies from -0.1 to 1.2. Many of these are quite high 
relative to what theory might expect. In the estimation reported in this paper, many of the 
coefficients on aid are negatively signed, but when they are positively signed, the magnitudes 
are in the range of about 0.01 and 0.2, which are much closer to what theory would predict.
23 
It is worth noting here that the coefficients on aid should be close to those on investment.  
Barro and Martin (1995, Chapter 12), in summarizing the cross-section growth estimates, 
suggest that a plausible coefficient on the investment to GDP ratio is about 0.03, that is a 1 
percentage point increase in the ratio of investment to GDP should increase per capita growth 
rate by 0.03 percent, even less than the (crude) theoretical estimate of 0.1 that we derive.  
 
 
V.    Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper had a simple objective: to present in one place and using one framework results 
on the different aspects of the aid-growth relationship and to do so both in cross-section and 
panel contexts and by addressing the problem of the endogeneity of aid.  
 
Our central conclusion is there is no robust positive relationship between aid and growth in 
the cross-section, and this despite the fact that our instrumentation strategy corrects for the 
bias in conventional (ordinary least squares) estimation procedures of finding a negative 
impact of aid on growth. This conclusion holds across:  
•  time horizons; 
•  time periods; 
•  cross-section and panel contexts 
•  types of aid distinguished by: 
o  what it is used for (economic, social, food, etc.); 
o  who gives it (multilateral donors, bilateral donors, good donors and others);  
o  who it is given to (those with good policies and institutions and others); 
o  who it is given to (those in the tropics and outside); and  
o  how long it takes to have effect (contemporaneous versus lagged ). 
 
In sum, we find that it is difficult to discern any systematic effect of aid on growth.  
One implication may simply be that the entire enterprise of running cross-country growth 
regressions may be plagued by noise in the data, which makes it hard to establish any 
relationship even if they actually exist. This possibility is strengthened by a simple 
theoretical exercise, which suggests that the effects of aid on growth are likely to be positive 
but much smaller than suggested by previous studies. If noise in the data plague all findings, 
then strong claims about aid effectiveness (or equally, on aid ineffectiveness) based on cross-
                                                 
23 The high coefficient values on aid in GMM regressions suggest that these regressions 
should be viewed with some degree of caution.   - 21 - 
 
country evidence are unwarranted, and aid policies that rely on such claims should be re-
examined. 
 
If noise is not the entire explanation (there are robust findings in the cross-country growth 
literature, such as the importance of institutions and policies for growth), one has to ask what 
aspects of aid offset what must be the indisputable growth enhancing effects of resource 
transfers. We then have to move away from the traditional cross-sectional analysis, and focus 
on more direct evidence of the channels through which aid might help or hinder growth. Such 
further research is essential to improve aid effectiveness. We attempt some answers in Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005). 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real annual average per capita GDP growth (PPP) 1.559 1.739 -3.373 6.794
Aid to GDP 6.105 6.949 0.087 28.378
Fitted aid to GDP 5.201 4.829 -7.046 19.707
Initial level of per capita (PPP) GDP 7.399 0.687 6.037 8.967
Initial level of trade policy 0.257 0.258 0.000 1.000
Initial level of life expectancy at birth 48.391 9.796 32.380 71.680
Geography -0.572 0.742 -1.040 1.528
Institutional quality 0.528 0.123 0.225 0.859
Initial inflation 14.755 32.605 -0.835 173.199
Initial M2/GDP 19.838 12.609 2.628 72.980
Initial budget balanc/GDP -3.874 4.936 -23.145 5.837
Average no. of revolutions  0.222 0.188 0.000 0.829
Ethnic fractionalization 0.479 0.288 0.004 0.902
Mult. aid/GDP 1.916 2.550 0.006 9.797
Bilat. aid/GDP 3.917 4.199 0.072 19.388
Real annual average per capita GDP growth (PPP) 0.931 2.177 -5.557 6.273
Aid to GDP 5.430 7.098 0.049 43.853
Fitted aid to GDP 4.406 4.177 -6.450 19.087
Initial level of per capita (PPP) GDP 7.886 0.833 6.094 9.347
Initial level of trade policy 0.434 0.349 0.000 1.000
Initial level of life expectancy at birth 57.426 9.817 35.400 74.600
Geography -0.490 0.807 -1.040 1.528
Institutional quality 0.534 0.128 0.225 0.859
Initial inflation 32.531 57.411 -0.835 351.970
Initial M2/GDP 30.675 15.647 8.133 78.361
Initial budget balanc/GDP -4.956 6.363 -39.088 3.384
Average no. of revolutions  0.248 0.264 0.000 1.286
Ethnic fractionalization 0.460 0.300 0.004 0.902
Mult. aid/GDP 2.170 3.226 0.001 17.184
Bilat. aid/GDP 3.768 4.673 0.047 29.702
Real annual average per capita GDP growth (PPP) 1.032 3.254 -11.518 15.762
Aid to GDP 4.689 6.756 0.011 50.069
Fitted aid to GDP 7.407 15.744 0.099 150.308
Initial level of per capita (PPP) GDP 8.062 0.810 6.094 9.794
Initial level of trade policy 0.364 0.482 0.000 1.000
Initial level of life expectancy at birth 61.425 9.564 35.200 77.350
Geography -0.409 0.837 -1.040 1.784
Institutional quality 0.485 0.172 0.056 0.912
Initial inflation 0.277 0.544 -0.005 4.192
Initial M2/GDP 35.097 20.753 3.932 124.251
Initial budget balanc/GDP -2.841 4.191 -21.556 14.526
Average no. of revolutions  0.244 0.414 0.000 2.600
Ethnic fractionalization 0.422 0.300 0.004 0.902
Mult. aid/GDP 1.510 2.803 0.000 21.770
Bilat. aid/GDP 3.015 4.070 0.019 26.169
Table 1: Summary Statistics
1960-00 (74 Obs.)
1980-00 (77 Obs.)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP -0.063 -0.076 -0.120 -0.008
(0.028)** (0.043)* (0.069)* (0.048)
Initial per cap. GDP -1.332 -1.668 -1.632 -1.147
(0.284)*** (0.317)*** (0.376)*** (0.559)**
Initial level of policy (Sachs-Warner) 1.788 2.278 2.303 -0.159
(0.431)*** (0.472)*** (0.773)*** (0.551)
Initial level of life expectancy 0.024 0.016 0.063 0.151
(0.020) (0.030) (0.041) (0.063)**
Geography 0.346 0.386 0.505 0.693
(0.132)** (0.179)** (0.224)** (0.408)*
Institutional quality 3.944 4.023 1.361 2.951
(1.490)** (2.223)* (2.281) (3.146)
Initial Inflation -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)***
Initial M2/GDP 0.017 0.016 -0.010 -0.003
(0.010) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014)
Initial Budget Balance/GDP -0.007 -0.014 -0.023 0.205
(0.024) (0.033) (0.035) (0.059)***
Revolutions -1.261 -1.310 -0.669 -0.491
(0.506)** (0.488)*** (0.627) (0.652)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.102 -0.391 0.045 1.742
(0.448) (0.704) (0.903) (1.084)
Observations 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.77 0.70 0.64 0.63
Table 2: Impact of Total Aid on Growth, OLS Estimations
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
 
All standard errors are robust and reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 
5, and 10 percent, respectively. All specifications include dummies for sub-Saharan African and East Asian 
countries. For descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1. The sample decreases for the 
1980-00 and 1990-00 time periods because data on budget balance becomes more sparse for the 1980s and 
1990s, so the initial value of budget balance cannot be computed for these periods. Outliers are excluded based 
on the Hadi (1992) procedure on the core IV specification in Table 4, which results in two countries being 
dropped from the 1980_00 horizon in all the results that are presented.   - 24 - 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Dummy for pairs that ever had a colonial relationship 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.014
(0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)***
Dummy for pairs currently in a colonial relationship -0.017 -0.010 -0.015 -0.011
(0.005)*** (0.006)* (0.006)** (0.008)
Dummy for pairs that have common language (Language Dummy) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with UK  -0.019 -0.020 -0.015 -0.010
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with France -0.045 -0.035 -0.026 -0.016
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with Spain -0.034 -0.029 -0.023 -0.019
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with Portugal 0.002 0.008 0.016 0.025
(0.005) (0.004)* (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*colony dummy 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*UK colony dummy -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*Spanish colony dummy 0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.002)* (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*French colony dummy 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.007
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*Portugese colony dummy 0.027 0.029 0.025 0.026
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Observations 3288 3288 3288 3249
R-squared 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.33
Table 3: Estimation of Exogenous Variation in the Allocation of Aid by Donors Across Recipients
(Dependent variable is aid / recipient GDP)
 
Estimation is by ordinary least squares.  The estimated equation corresponds to equation 1 in Section II of the 
paper. All standard errors are robust. Absolute value of t-statistics reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  For descriptions of the variables and their 
sources, see Appendix 1. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP 0.063 0.096 -0.004 -0.389
(0.061) (0.070) (0.095) (0.194)**
Initial per cap. GDP -1.175 -1.409 -1.454 -2.193
(0.387)*** (0.435)*** (0.446)*** (0.692)***
Initial level of policy (Sachs-Warner) 1.620 2.139 2.332 -0.065
(0.666)** (0.619)*** (0.835)*** (0.726)
Initial level of life expectancy 0.059 0.076 0.102 0.047
(0.028)** (0.039)* (0.050)** (0.089)
Geography 0.526 0.606 0.605 0.211
(0.187)*** (0.259)** (0.255)** (0.421)
Institutional quality 4.558 4.077 0.843 6.437
(1.698)*** (2.328)* (2.484) (3.588)*
Initial Inflation -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)*
Initial M2/GDP 0.017 0.010 -0.011 -0.003
(0.012) (0.020) (0.025) (0.014)
Initial Budget Balance/GDP 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.195
(0.029) (0.036) (0.042) (0.093)**
Revolutions -1.144 -1.406 -0.719 -0.350
(0.618)* (0.656)** (0.670) (0.778)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.712 0.788 0.818 -0.092
(0.609) (0.851) (1.055) (1.414)
O b s e r v a t i o n s 7 4 7 87 57 0
R-squared 0.66 0.59 0.61 0.37
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Fitted Aid/GDP 0.695 0.639 0.603 0.494
(0.139)*** (0.114)*** (0.111)*** (0.169)***
O b s e r v a t i o n s 7 4 7 87 57 0
R-squared 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.68
F-value 25.20 31.58 29.38 8.53
(Dependent variable is average of the ratio of total aid to GDP)
Table 4B: Impact of Total Aid on Growth, First Stage Regressions
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
Table 4A: Impact of Total Aid on Growth, IV Estimations
 
All standard errors are robust and reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 
5, and 10 percent, respectively. All specifications include dummies for sub-Saharan African and East Asian 
countries. The instrument for aid corresponds to that in (1) and (2) in Section II of the paper. All specifications 
include dummies for sub-Saharan African and East Asian countries. Other covariates in the first-stage 
regression are omitted for presentational convenience. Throughout the paper, the values of the potentially 
endogenous covariates are for the beginning of the relevant time period (or strictly speaking the first available 
value closest to the initial year of the relevant time period). Outliers are excluded based on the Hadi (1992) 
procedure. For descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1.   - 26 - 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP 0.051 0.080 -0.052 -0.308
(0.052) (0.065) (0.090) (0.158)*
Colony UK 0.019 0.557 0.905 -0.604
(0.445) (0.538) (0.548) (0.785)
Colony France 0.418 0.931 0.585 -1.461
(0.500) (0.656) (0.559) (0.741)*
Colony Spain 0.407 0.225 -0.941 -1.096
(0.544) (0.674) (0.517)* (1.142)
O b s e r v a t i o n s 7 4 7 87 57 0
R-squared 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.50
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
Table 5A: Impact of Total Aid on Growth, IV Estimations
  
This specification is exactly as in Table 4A except for the addition of three colony dummies. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP 0.052 0.096 0.008 -0.251
(0.052) (0.068) (0.094) (0.150)
Observations 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.68 0.59 0.60 0.52
P-value for test of over-identifying restrictions 0.52 0.90 0.14 0.05
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Fitted Aid/Initial GDP 0.560 0.596 0.569 0.279
(0.171)*** (0.145)*** (0.143)*** (0.207)
Log Area -0.582 -0.160 -0.097 -0.613
(0.436) (0.332) (0.259) (0.354)*
Observations 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.70
(Dependent variable is average of the ratio of total aid to GDP)
Table 5C: Impact of Total Aid on Growth, IV Estimations (First Stage)
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
Table 5B: Impact of Total Aid on Growth, IV Estimations (Second-Stage)
 
In Tables 5B and 5C, there are two instruments for aid. The first is based on equation 1 in the text and the 
second is the logarithm of a country’s area (in sq. kms.). Table 5B is the second stage while Table 5C is the first 
stage. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP -0.091 -0.006 2.367 0.157
(0.152) (0.761) (7.554) (0.286)
Fitted Aid/GDP 0.107 0.065 -1.428 -0.270
(0.116) (0.494) (4.547) (0.158)*
Observations 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.81 0.69 n.a. 0.65
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
Table 5D: Impact of Total Aid on Growth, IV Estimations (Second Stage)
 
In Table 5D, aid is instrumented by the logarithm of a country’s area (in sq. kms.) while fitted aid is the 
instrument based on equation 1 in the paper.  - 27 - 
 
Growth Horizon=40 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 1960-80 1980-00 1960-90 1970-00 1960-00
Aid Horizon=10 years
1960-70 -0.163 0.061 -0.281 -0.082 0.027 -0.171 -0.078 -0.072 -0.088
(0.127) (0.154) (0.116)** (0.087) (0.073) (0.104) (0.058) (0.072) (0.056)
1970-80 0.049 -0.153 -0.035 0.012 -0.047 -0.046 -0.013 -0.046
(0.080) (0.065)** (0.060) (0.042) (0.051) (0.034) (0.043) (0.032)
1980-90 n.a. n.a. -0.182 -0.028 n.a. -0.062 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.057)*** (0.067) (0.046)
1990-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.094)
Aid Horizon=20 years
1960-80 n.a. n.a. -0.117 -0.025 0.019 -0.033 -0.049 -0.007 -0.032
(0.051)** (0.047) (0.034) (0.040) (0.024)** (0.036) (0.027)
1980-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.017 -0.120 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.099) (0.069)*
Aid Horizon=30 years
1960-90 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.014 n.a. n.a. -0.059 n.a. -0.043
(0.058) (0.024)** (0.019)**
1970-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.022 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.094 -0.085
(0.093) (0.040)** (0.029)***
Aid Horizon=40 years
1960-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.076
(0.027)***
Table 6: The Effect of Aid Under Alternative Assumptions About Timing of Impact: OLS Estimations
Growth Horizon=10 years Growth Horizon=20 years Growth Horizon=30 years
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
 
All standard errors are robust, and are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All specifications include dummies for sub-Saharan African and East Asian 
countries. Other covariates are omitted for presentational simplicity. Each entry corresponds to the coefficient 
of aid in a regression whose time period is denoted by the column heading and where the aid variable is 
averaged over the period denoted by the row heading. For descriptions of the variables and their sources, see 
Appendix 1.   - 28 - 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP -0.258 -0.169 8.573 1.044
(0.191) (0.166) (47.949) (2.797)
Aid/GDP-squared 0.013 0.011 -0.576 -0.081
(0.010) (0.008) (3.165) (0.145)
Observations 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.60 0.58
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *,**, and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP 0.148 0.141 -0.037 -0.460
(0.161) (0.153) (0.107) (0.241)*
Policy (Sachs-Warner) 2.943 2.687 -0.492 -2.340
(1.539)* (1.079)** (2.205) (2.019)
Aid/GDP*policy -0.356 -0.144 1.747 0.610
(0.489) (0.361) (1.462) (0.564)
Observations 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.32 0.24
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *,**, and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5%, and 1%, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Aid/GDP 0.034 0.093 -0.120 -0.490
(0.058) (0.081) (0.159) (0.180)***
Geography 0.644 0.617 0.972 0.582
(0.223)*** (0.249)** (0.310)*** (0.487)
Aid/GDP*Geography -0.043 -0.004 -0.187 -0.180
(0.054) (0.068) (0.156) (0.147)
Observations 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.63 0.59 0.53 0.47
Panel 7B: Aid interacted with Sachs-Warner Policy measure
Panel 7C: Aid interacted with Geography
Table 7: Aid and Growth: Diminishing Returns and Conditional Impacts, IV Estimations
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
Panel 7A: Aid-square term
 
All standard errors are robust, and are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. The instrument for aid corresponds to equation 3 in Section II of the paper.. 
Other covariates are omitted for presentational simplicity.  For descriptions of the variables and their sources, 
see Appendix 1.   - 29 - 
 
Table 8: Impact of Different Categories of Aid 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00 1960_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Mult. aid/GDP 0.184 0.241 -0.062 -0.702
(0.189) (0.206) (0.207) (0.374)*
Bilat. aid/GDP 0.091 0.139 0.003 -0.504
(0.087) (0.098) (0.139) (0.249)**
Observations 74 78 75 70 74 78 75 70
R-squared 0.65 0.57 0.62 0.42 0.67 0.60 0.60 0.39
Multilateral Aid






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 1960-80 1980-00 1960-90 1970-00 1960-00
Aid Horizon=10 years
1960-70 -1.122 7.312 -2.304 1.695 2.587 -0.381 0.054 0.982 0.755
(4.041) (4.227)* (4.011) (3.525) (2.802) (2.343) (2.417) (1.939) (1.676)
1970-80 n.a. 0.623 -1.375 -0.593 -0.071 -1.088 -0.378 -0.203 -0.428
(0.658) (0.590)** (0.559) (0.342) (0.701) (0.264) (0.367) (0.284)
1980-90 n.a. n.a. -0.566 0.735 n.a. -0.291 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.326)* (0.613) (0.313)
1990-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.721 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.527)
Aid Horizon=20 years
1960-80 n.a. n.a. -1.066 -0.421 -0.012 -0.824 -0.261 -0.168 0.055
(0.433)** (0.401) (0.234) (0.514) (0.191) (0.277) (0.239)
1980-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.411 -0.231 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.528) (0.372)
Aid Horizon=30 years
1960-90 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.473 n.a. n.a. -0.458 n.a. -0.165
(0.779) (0.360) (0.165)
1970-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.461 n.a. n.a. -0.325 -0.206
(0.705) (0.323) (0.302)
Aid Horizon=40 years
1960-00 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.169
(0.270)
Panel 8B: Impact of Aid Given by Top 5 "Good Donors," OLS Regression Results 
Growth Horizon=10 years Growth Horizon=20 years Growth Horizon=30 years

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1970_00 1980_00 1990_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Late-impact aid/GDP 0.170 -0.007 -0.478
(0.111) (0.146) (0.228)**
Early-impact aid/GDP 0.197 -0.026 -0.653
(0.141) (0.169) (0.397)
Observations 71 71 70 71 71 70
R-squared 0.64 0.60 0.40 0.61 0.61 0.36
Late-impact Early-impact





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1970_00 1980_00 1990_00 1970_00 1980_00 1990_00
Social sector aid/GDP 0.359 -0.048 -1.148
(0.280) (0.420) (0.516)**
Economic aid/GDP 0.088 -0.020 -0.476
(0.067) (0.090) (0.354)
Observations 78 75 70 78 75 70
R-squared 0.64 0.61 0.45 0.60 0.61 0.30
Economic
Panel 8C: Social and Economic Aid
Social
 
All standard errors are robust, and are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Other covariates are omitted for presentational simplicity. In Panel 8B, top 
5 donors comprise Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland. In Table 8B, estimation uses OLS.  For 
descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1.   - 31 - 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid/GDP -0.151 -0.015 -0.168 0.163
(0.077)** (0.207) (0.140) (0.140)
Policy (Sachs-Warner) -1.774 -1.326 -1.309 -0.990







Initial per cap. GDP -8.347 -7.998 -7.772 -8.165
(1.543)*** (1.414)*** (1.552)*** (1.260)***
Initial level of life expectancy -0.393 -0.209 -0.229 -0.213
(0.183)** (0.157) (0.156) (0.153)
Institutional quality 6.953 5.665 6.093 6.575
(2.767)** (2.225)** (2.350)*** (2.392)***
Log Inflation -1.985 -1.838 -1.978 -1.687
(0.671)*** (0.596)*** (0.882)** (0.829)**
M2/GDP -0.002 -0.015 -0.015 -0.001
(0.032) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031)
Budget Balance/GDP 0.164 0.117 0.141 0.139
(0.082)** (0.076) (0.070)** (0.082)*
Revolutions -0.972 -1.174 -1.321 -1.427
(0.625) (0.624)* (0.831) (0.675)**
Observations 167 167 167 167
Number of Groups 68 68 68 68
Chi-Square (Hansen over-id test) 0.485 0.423 0.544 0.536
AR(2) (test for serial correlation) 0.198 0.269 0.255 0.199
GMM estimation method Difference Difference Difference Difference
Endogenous variables  Initial income, Initial income, Initial income, Initial income,
used as instruments aid, policy, aid, policy, aid, policy, aid, policy,
inst. quality, inst. quality, inst. quality, inst. quality,
inflation, M2, inflation, M2, inflation, M2, inflation, M2,
budget balance, budget balance, budget balance, budget balance,
revolutions, revolutions, revolutions, revolutions,
life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy
No. of  lags of endogenous  Eight Eight Eight Eight
varuiables used in instrumentation
Exogenous variable used  Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic
as instrument Geography Geography Geography Geography
Table 9: GMM Panel Regressions (Arellano-Bond Procedure)
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
 
All standard errors are robust and reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 
5, and 10 percent, respectively. Regressions use the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. For 
descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1.   - 32 - 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid/GDP -0.054 -0.187 -0.046 -0.165
(0.114) (0.135) (0.119) (0.087)*
Policy (Sachs-Warner) 1.370 0.722 1.026 0.855
(1.015) (0.933) (0.845) (0.900)
Geography 0.496 0.490 0.596 0.717







Initial per cap. GDP -2.456 -2.536 -2.497 -1.994
(1.057)** (0.603)*** (0.819)*** (0.694)***
Initial level of life expectancy 0.086 0.076 0.105 0.093
(0.098) (0.080) (0.098) (0.087)
Institutional quality 2.748 3.173 3.644 3.705
(2.579) (1.932) (2.327) (2.211)*
Log Inflation -1.498 -1.812 -1.685 -1.693
(0.663)** (0.627)*** (0.692)** (0.580)***
M2/GDP 0.010 0.008 -0.003 0.010
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Budget Balance/GDP 0.101 0.111 0.168 0.138
(0.075) (0.070) (0.068)** (0.082)*
Revolutions -0.073 -0.184 -0.301 -0.508
(0.992) (0.437) (0.582) (0.763)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.129 -0.178 0.331 1.246
(1.809) (2.139) (1.870) (2.552)
Observations 239 239 239 239
Number of Groups 72 72 72 72
Chi-Square (Hansen over-id test) 0.391 0.598 0.287 0.371
AR(2) (test for serial correlation) 0.298 0.224 0.287 0.285
GMM estimation method System System System System
Endogenous variables  Initial income, Initial income, Initial income, Initial income,
used as instruments aid, policy, aid, policy, aid, policy, aid, policy,
inst. quality, inst. quality, inst. quality, inst. quality,
inflation, M2, inflation, M2, inflation, M2, inflation, M2,
budget balance, budget balance, budget balance, budget balance,
revolutions, revolutions, revolutions, revolutions,
life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy
No. of  lags of endogenous  Eight Eight Eight Eight
varuiables used in instrumentation
Exogenous variable used  Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic
as instrument Geography Geography Geography Geography
Table 10: GMM Panel Regressions (Blundell-Bond procedure)
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
 
All standard errors are robust and reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 
5, and 10 percent, respectively. Regressions use the Blundell-Bond  (1998) system GMM estimator. For 
descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1.   - 33 - 
 


































































































-5 0 5 10
Residuals of Fitted Aid/GDP
coef = .69522287, se = .13858702, t = 5.02
 
The chart plots the first-stage relationship between actual and the instrument (fitted aid), conditional on all the 
covariates that enter the second-stage growth regression. The slope of the line is the coefficient on fitted aid in 
this first-stage regression (also shown in Table 4B).   - 34 - 
 

















































































































-10 -5 0 5 10 15
Residuals of Aid/GDP
coef = -.06308045, (robust) se = .02796237, t = -2.26
 
The chart plots the relationship between growth and actual aid, conditional on all the covariates. The slope of 
the line is the coefficient on aid in the OLS regression in column 1 of Table 2.    - 35 - 
 
 
  Appendix 1. Data Description and  Sources 
   
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1 (PWT), Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
OECD,  DAC (Development Assistance Committee) database on Aid, 2002. 
World Bank, 2004. World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 2004,. World Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
Bosworth, B., and S. Collins, 2003, “The Empirics of Growth: An Update,” mimeo, 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 
 
Barro and Lee, 1994: Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries. The data set contains variables for the panel 
estimation. Data are presented either quinquennially for the years 1960-1985, i.e., 1960, 1965,1970, 1975, 1980, 
and 1985, or for averages of five years' sub-periods over 1960-1985. Barro, R., Lee, J-W., 1994, Data Set for a 
Panel of 138 Countries. Revised January 1994. 
 
Arthur S. Banks Banks, Arthur S. CROSS-NATIONAL TIME SERIES, 1815-2002 [Computer file]. Databanks 
International ed. Binghamton, NY: Databanks International [Producer and Distributor], 2002. 
Wacziarg, Romain and Karen Horn Welch (2003) “Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence,” Mimeo, 
Stanford University. 
Correlates of War 2: This data set records all formal alliances among states between 1816 and 2000, including 
mutual defense pacts, non-aggression treaties, and ententes. 
Correlates of War Project, 2002, Correlates of War 2, University of Michigan 
Rose, A.K., “Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?” 2004, American Economic Review. 
Easterly website (Macro Time Series 2005) 
    
Variable Name  Variable Description  Source 
Real economic 
growth 
Annual average growth rate of real GDP (PPP) per capita where 
the averages are taken over the relveant time period.  Countries 
are included in the sample for the 1960-00 horizon if there are 
data for at least 35 years; for the 1970-00 horizon for at least 25 
years of data; for the 1980-00 horizon for at least 15 years of 
data; for the 1990-00 horizon for at least 5 years; and for the 
panel for at least 3 years.  PWT, version 6.1 
    
Aid to GDP 
The ratio of aggregate net development assistance that is 
disbursed in current US dollars to GDP in current US dollars. It 
includes all loan and grants undertaken by the official sector with 
the promotion of economic development as the main objective 
and where loans have a grant element of at least 25 percent.  OECD,  DAC 
    
    
Bilateral aid to 
GDP 
Bilateral aid includes aid from 22 donor countries defined in the 
OECD’s DAC.  OECD,  DAC 




Multilateral aid is identified in the OECD’s DAC database and 
includes assistance from the World Banbk, and the regional 
development banks.   
Social sector aid 
to GDP 
Social sector aid includes assistance for education, health and 
population and water supply and sanitation. Data on this category 
of aid is in terms of commitments. This was converted to 
disbursements by taking the ratio of commitments in this sector to 
overall commitments and then multiplying this by aggregate aid 
disbursements.  OECD,  DAC 
Economic aid to 
GDP 
Economic aid includes assistance for energy and transport and 
communications. Data on this category of aid is in terms of 
commitments. This was converted to disbursements by taking the 
ratio of commitments in this sector to overall commitments and 
then multiplying this by aggregate aid disbursements.  OECD,  DAC 
Initial GDP 
Log of per capita (PPP) GDP at the beginning of the relevant time 
period. For example, for the horizon, initial GDP is for the year 
1960. PWT,  6.1 
    
Initial life 
expectancy 
Life expectancy at birth in years at the beginning of the relavent 
time period. For example, for the horizon, initial life expectancy 
is for the year 1960 or for the closest year for which data are 
available.  WDI 
Geography  Average of number of frost days and tropical land area  Bosworth & Collins, 2003 
Institutional 
quality 
For the cross-section, the data are from Bosworth and Collins 
who use the ICRGE index averaged over the period 1986-1995. 
For the GMM regressions, data are averages for the relevant 5-
year period.  Bosworth & Collins, 2003 
Initial inflation 
The average annual rate of growth of CPI-based inflation for the 
first five years of the relevant time horizon.  For example, for the 




    
Initial financial 
depth 
The ratio of M2/GDP for the first five years of the relevant time 
horizon. Easterly’s  website 
    
Initial budget 
balance 
The ratio of general government budget balance to GDP for the 
first five years of the relevant time horizon.  WDI 
    
Revolutions 
The average number of revolutions per year in the relevant time 
horizon. Revolutions are defined as any illegal or forced change 
in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or 
any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is 
independence from the central government.  Arthur S. Banks 
    
Initial policy 
The Sachs-Warner trade policy index as updated by Wacziarg 
and Welch and prevailing at the beginning of the relevant time 
horizon or the year closest to it.   Wacziarg & Welch, 2003 
Alliance dummy  Dummy that takes  a value of 1 if donor and recipient country are  Correlates of War, 2   - 37 - 
 
part of the same entente alliance 
    
Egypt-Israel 
dummy 
Dummy that takes a value of 1 if donor is US and recipient is  
Egypt or Israel  Authors' calculations 
    
colony 
Dummy that takes  a value of 1 if donor and recipient country 
were ever in colonial relationship  Rose, 2004 
    
Current colony 
Dummy that takes  a value of 1 if donor and recipient country 
enjoy a current colonial relationship  Rose, 2004 
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Appendix 2. Sample of Countries   
Country 1960_00  1980_00  Panel     Country 1960_00  1980_00  Panel 
Algeria yes  yes  yes     Korea, Rep.  yes  yes  yes 
Argentina yes  yes  yes     Lesotho  yes  yes  no 
Bangladesh yes  yes  yes     Madagascar  yes  yes  yes 
Benin yes  no  no     Malawi  yes  yes  yes 
Bolivia yes  yes  yes     Malaysia  yes  yes  yes 
Botswana yes  yes  yes     Mali  yes  yes  yes 
Brazil yes  yes  yes     Mauritania  yes  no  no 
Bulgaria no  no  yes     Mauritius  yes  yes  no 
Burkina Faso  yes  yes  yes     Mexico  yes  yes  yes 
Burundi yes  yes  no     Morocco  yes  yes  yes 
Cameroon yes  yes  yes     Namibia  yes  yes  yes 
Chad yes  yes  no     Nicaragua  yes  yes  yes 
Chile yes  yes  yes     Niger  yes  yes  no 
China yes  yes  yes     Nigeria  yes  yes  yes 
Colombia yes  yes  yes     Pakistan  yes  yes  yes 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  yes  yes  yes     Panama  yes  yes  yes 
Congo, Rep.  yes  yes  yes     Papua New Guinea  yes  yes  yes 
Costa Rica  yes  yes  yes     Paraguay  yes  yes  yes 
Cote d'Ivoire  yes  yes  yes     Peru  yes  yes  yes 
Cyprus yes  yes  yes     Philippines  yes  yes  yes 
Dominican Republic  yes  yes  yes     Poland  no  yes  yes 
Ecuador yes  yes  yes     Romania  yes  yes  yes 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  yes  yes  yes     Russian Federation  no  no  yes 
El Salvador  yes  yes  yes     Rwanda  yes  yes  no 
Ethiopia yes  yes  yes     Senegal  yes  yes  yes 
Fiji yes  yes  no     Sierra Leone  no  yes  yes 
Gabon yes  yes  yes     Singapore  yes  yes  yes 
Gambia, The  yes  yes  yes     South Africa  yes  yes  yes 
Ghana yes  yes  yes     Sri Lanka  yes  yes  yes 
Guatemala yes  yes  yes     Syrian Arab Republic  yes  yes  yes 
GuineaBissau yes  yes  yes     Thailand  yes  yes  yes 
Guyana yes  yes  no     Togo  yes  yes  yes 
Haiti no  yes  yes     Trinidad & Tobago  yes  yes  yes 
Honduras yes  no  no     Tunisia  no  yes  yes 
Hungary no  yes  yes     Turkey  yes  yes  yes 
India yes  yes  yes     Uganda  yes  yes  yes 
Indonesia yes  yes  yes     Uruguay  yes  yes  yes 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  yes  yes  yes     Venezuela, RB  yes  yes  yes 
Israel yes  yes  yes     Yemen, Rep.  no  no  yes 
Jamaica yes  yes  yes     Zambia  yes  yes  yes 
Jordan no  yes  yes     Zimbabwe  yes  yes  yes 
Kenya yes  yes  yes                
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In this appendix we derive a theoretical estimate of the impact of aid on growth based on the 
standard Solow-Swan Growth model.  The model assumes that a fraction of aid goes toward 




1 YA K L
α α − =           - - - ( 1 )  
 
Equation 1 is a simple Cobb-Douglas production function, with α representing the share of 




α =  
 
Where y = Y/L and k = K/L 
 
The equation for capital accumulation is: 
 
.
() ( ) KI K I gI p K pK g δδ =− = + − +      ---(2) 
 
where the subscripts refer to the private and government sectors, and δ the depreciation rate. 
Assuming that a fraction β of aid is invested by the government, with the rest representing 
consumption or waste, equation (2) can be re-written as: 
 
.








δ =+ − +         ---(3) 
 
where n represents the population growth rate. 
  
The rate of growth of output per worker γy can be expressed in terms of the rate of growth of 





γα == +                          ---(4) 
                                                 
24 We are grateful to Marta Ruiz-Arranz for this proof.   - 40 - 
 
 










γ αα δ α =+ − + +        ---(5) 
 
The coefficient in cross-country growth regressions measures the change in growth with 
respect to the change in the ratio of aid to GDP.  We need to convert equation (5) into one 










γ αδ α =+ − + +       ---(6) 
 
  









=          - - - ( 7 )  
 
Equation 7 implies that the coefficient of aid in a cross-country growth regression should be 
related to the capital share in income (α), the fraction of aid that is invested (β), and the 
output capital ratio (Y/K). 
 
Assuming that all aid is invested (β =1), and using a value of capital share =0.35 computed 
by Bosworth and Collins (2003), and the average value of the output-capital ratio for the 
developing countries in our regressions sample which is about 0.45, the magnitude of the 
regression coefficient amounts to 0.16; that is, a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of aid 
to GDP should raise the growth rate by 0.16 percent, even on the most optimistic assumption 
that all aid is usefully invested. More realistically, if half of all aid is wasted or consumed, 
the coefficient value should be 0.08 or close to 0.1. 
 
It is possible that equation 7 underestimates the value of aid because it ignores the fact that 
the public investment financed by aid has spillovers and hence economy-wide productivity 











=+                                                      ---(7)’ 
 
The last term on the right hand side captures the effect of aid on productivity growth. It is 
difficult to know whether and to what extent public investment has had such productivity   - 41 - 
 
impacts in aid-receiving countries. The IT revolution in the US since the mid-1990s added 
about 0.5 percent per year to productivity growth. Extrapolating from this, it seems that an 
upper limit for the impact of aid on growth would be about 0.2-0.25 percent per year for 




Dummy for pairs that ever had a colonial relationship 0.009 0.007 0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Dummy for pairs currently in a colonial relationship 0.001 -0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Dummy for pairs that have common language (Language Dummy) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with UK  -0.010 -0.008 -0.007
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with France -0.018 -0.015 -0.012
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with Spain -0.019 -0.016 -0.012
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Dummy for country that ever had a colonial relationship with Portugal -0.001 0.002 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*colony dummy 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*UK colony dummy -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*Spanish colony dummy 0.004 0.003 0.000
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*French colony dummy 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)***
Ratio of logarithm of population of donor relative to recipient*Portugese colony dummy 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Observations 2275 2263 2205
R-squared 0.43 0.37 0.37
Appendix Table 1. Estimation of Exogenous Variation in the Allocation of Social Aid by Donors Across Recipients
(Dependent Variable is share of donor's social aid to recipient)
 
Estimation is by ordinary least squares.  The estimated equation corresponds to equation 1 in Section II of the 
paper. The dependent variable is the share of social sector aid given by donor i to recipient j. All standard errors 
are robust. T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively.  For descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Social sector aid/GDP -0.892
(0.813)




















Bilat. aid/GDP Square -0.004
(0.005)
Observations 165 162 163 163 167 167
Number of Groups 68 67 66 66 68 68
Chi-Square (Hansen over-id test) 0.379 0.337 0.643 0.299 0.296 0.688
AR(2) (test for serial correlation) 0.056 0.067 0.220 0.167 0.186 0.221
Appendix Table 2: GMM Panel Regressions (Arellano-Bond Procedure)
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
 
All standard errors are robust and reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 
5, and 10 percent, respectively. Regressions use the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. For 
descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Social sector aid/GDP 0.107
(0.728)




















Bilat. aid/GDP Square 0.007
(0.010)
Observations 237 235 235 235 239 239
Number of Groups 72 72 72 72 72 72
Chi-Square (Hansen over-id test) 0.579 0.427 0.545 0.428 0.546 0.464
AR(2) (test for serial correlation) 0.287 0.123 0.320 0.157 0.248 0.234
Appendix Table 3: GMM Panel Regressions (Blundell-Bond Procedure)
(Dependent variable is average annual growth of per capita GDP)
 
All standard errors are robust and reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 
5, and 10 percent, respectively. Regressions use the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. For 
descriptions of the variables and their sources, see Appendix 1. 
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